By R. I. G. Hughes
This quantity of contemporary writings, a few formerly unpublished, follows the series of a customary intermediate or upper-level good judgment path and permits academics to complement their displays of formal equipment and effects with readings on corresponding questions in philosophical good judgment.
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First released in 2004. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa corporation.
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They both utter (or write) words; and they both use words which can be used to inform (or to misinform). The difference is that the man who makes an inconsistent statement arranges these words in such a way that we regard him as having said something which cancels itself. This is an unsatisfactory way of using words, and we compare this with the unsatisfactoriness of the way in which we use words when we make a false statement. For the general and standard purpose of making statements is to communicate information, to state facts.
Believing L :J N, that is ~ L, that is very likely. FIG. 1 ~L v N, to be slightly more probable than L ~N r-NN ~L ~L ~N vN j To judge it probable that A :J B is to judge it improbable that A & ~B. To judge it probable that if A, B is not only to judge it improbable that A & ~ B, but to judge this to be less probable than A & B. ' (see Figure 2). FIG. 2 A B A&B A&~B That A & ~ B be small, which is necessary and sufficient for the conditional to be probable on the truth-functional account, is necessary but not sufficient on this account.
2. It is worth remarking that the existence of logical consequences of moral judgements, rules, laws, etc. also suggests that the classical account of validity is limited in scope. Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions? 49 affairs identified obtains. For him, the argument shows that there are no conditional states of affairs. For an anti-realist who construes truth along the lines of what is ideally rationally acceptable, it is much more puzzling that the notion cannot be applied to conditionals.
A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic by R. I. G. Hughes
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